Until recently, China was the world’s most populous country with around 1.4 billion people, equivalent to a staggering 17.72% of the total world population. Yet, an irreversible population decline in China has led to India overtaking it as the world’s most populous country. Reasons for this mainly centre around the transition of China’s traditional centrally planned economy to a mixed economy, allowing for greater freedom from the state in many industries. This has allowed for China to become an internationally competitive country, with employment opportunities for men and women that has resulted in households no longer feeling obligated to have children. In fact, between 2019 and 2021, large Chinese provinces and cities have seen huge drops in birth rates, largely due to China’s economic boom. China’s urbanisation has also shown a change of view in a woman’s “purpose” and “role” in the household, particularly in rural areas. Chinese traditions that were once focussed on women being responsible for all domestic duties and having children, rather than aspiring to obtain a future career, have given way to greater emphasis on gender equality, especially in education. These progressive values have encouraged women to work rather than settling down and is leading to a view that marriage and birth are barriers to freedom.
However, the one-child policy implemented from 1980 to 2016 comes to mind as the most significant and impactful cause for this population change. Economic pressures and food insecurity during this period meant that Deng Xiaoping had to introduce this measure for the welfare of society. But many economists argue that, whilst this may have reduced short-term economic pressures, the policy is quite detrimental to China’s future economy. Predictions that China will surpass USA’s GDP in 2041 are now projected to be in danger due to its rapidly ageing population. One would never link a population shortage to such a populous country, but this can be seen in its shrinking labour force and consequent decrease in productivity levels. As an export-led economy, this could potentially have devastating consequences to both China’s domestic economy as well as global markets. China’s influence on the international stage is greatly threatened by its elderly demographic – by 2040, people 60 years or older will make up 28% of the population.
From a global perspective, this can potentially threaten many developing countries that rely on Chinese aid and investment. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has put 150 countries under its influence, which has undermined US influence as a major creditor across the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. Whether this is through the Belt and Road Initiative which is specifically a global infrastructure development project, or bilateral agreements, such as with Libya or Tanzania, China has transformed into the largest investor in the world. Therefore, population decline can have harmful effects in countries that have deep economic ties with China, particularly when major investments in developing countries are at stake. Sub-Saharan Africa is especially vulnerable to China’s economic slowdown – IMF (International Monetary Fund) shows how a 1% decrease in China’s growth rate can reduce growth in sub-Saharan Africa by 0.25%. We’ve already seen Chinese loans fall in this region since 2017. Lower investment and aid are bound to increase poverty with lower employment, living standards and development in general.
One can put a positive spin on this by arguing that a decline in Chinese influence on developing countries provides governments a perfect opportunity to escape from this “dependency culture.” Reports offer evidence that China’s investments are targeted at not improving conditions in countries, but rather exploiting Africa’s abundant natural resources. Geopolitically, this is a strategic move by China to improve their own economic growth and therefore dominance in the world, as well as compete with US influence and capitalist interests. Therefore, lower levels of Chinese commitments in African countries will allow them to become more self-sufficient or rely on other
countries such as the USA, improve competitiveness, and perhaps diversify their own exports for faster growth.
It is fair to say that this is a pivotal moment in global geopolitics and will have a significant impact on the shift in power dynamics between continents and nations; this will certainly be closely monitored by all countries as well as global institutions, such as the World Bank.
Cara H, Editor of Unconquered Peaks, looks at the key reasons that led David Cameron to hold the 2016 EU referendum.
In this essay I focus on the factors which led to the 2016 Referendum being held, rather than the result. David Cameron called the 2016 EU Referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU) in 2015, giving the British public the right to decide whether their future would be in or out of the EU. They chose to leave the EU by a margin of 51.9% leave, versus 48.1% remain. The UK-EU relationship has always been complicated and fraught, ever since joining in 1973. Factors analysed are ‘important’ as they led to Euroscepticism in British politics or the British public, and/or led to political pressure on Cameron to hold a referendum on EU membership.
I argue that the UK’s historic
relationship with the EU contrasts sharply with their current aims. As for
immigration, general anti-immigration sentiment, and the rise of UKIP (which are
very much linked) strongly contributed to Euroscepticism and political pressure
on Cameron. I also touch on Cameron himself, and his decision making around quelling
his backbenchers.
A transactional vs political
relationship
Britain has
always viewed the EU differently to our European friends. Whilst most of Europe
see themselves as European, Britons are the least likely to have Europe form
part of their identity (see graph below), and do not have the same allegiance
to Europe in comparisons to the German or French. Instead, we view our
relationship with the EU as transactional, through a cost-benefit, economic
analysis. This can be clearly traced back to our original reasons for joining.
(Eurobarometer, 2015)
In the late
1950s, Britain was experiencing a post-war economic rut, while Germany and
France were experiencing strong growth. Britain’s spheres of influence were
declining, and trade with the USA and Commonwealth had decreased. This led to
the belief that joining the bloc might remedy the UK’s economic problems.
Macmillan, the UK Prime Minister at the time, “saw the European Community
as an economic panacea… here was a way in which the British economy could
overcome so many of its problems without resorting to a radical and painful
domestic economic overhaul” (Holmes, n.d.) This analysis of
Britain’s reasons for joining contrasts sharply with the EU’s increasingly
political aims. Though Britain arguably shares the aims of the European Project,
it does not share the same desire to become one with Europe and is interested
in the EU only economically. Having joined the EU for economic reasons, and later
being faced with political integration, increased tensions.
These
tensions between an economic, free trade-based union and a political
integratory one, have been the backdrop of the UK’s interactions with the EU.
For example, the Eurozone Crisis in the UK especially damaged views towards
Europe, not simply because of what happened, but because the ‘cost’ of
remaining a member became highlighted. The heightened tensions within the
political establishments of the UK and the EU have seeped into the general
public psyche. Therefore, the dual nature of the EU as a trade-bloc and a
political union had a negative impact on the UK’s relationship with the EU, by
increasing Euroscepticism, and in turn increasing political pressure on Cameron
to hold a referendum in 2016.
Immigration concerns conflated
with EU
Freedom of
movement is enshrined in the EU’s ‘DNA’. As stated in 1957 in the Treaty of
Rome, it can be defined as ‘EU nationals having the right to move freely within
the European Union and to enter and reside in any EU member state’ (Bundesministeriums des Innern, 2015). Non-EU immigration
levels have always been higher than EU immigration levels. Meaning that the
argument around freedom of movement as a cause of unsustainable immigration has
been greatly exaggerated. It is the perception of EU immigration that has
stuck; the EU became synonymous with immigration of any kind, whether this is misguided
or not.
The increased
level of non-EU and EU immigration put pressure on aspects of British culture
which are not so open to those perceived as ‘non-British’. Integration is often
difficult for those of a different culture. For example, differences in
language, traditions and skills, can lead to those with a strong sense of British
national identity perceiving immigrants negatively, as they threaten what some
see as British culture. And yet this immigration concern is incorrectly conflated
with the EU, as the majority of immigration to the UK has little to do with the
European Union (though one could also argue that all British anti-immigration
sentiment is largely unfounded, regardless of the place of origin). An
excellent paper by Chatham House presents a cross analysis of people’s voting
choices (leave vs remain), compared to their attitudes towards immigration
(both non-EU and EU). The trait that most divided the ‘leavers’ from the ‘remainers’
was their attitudes towards immigration and British culture: nearly ¾ of
‘outers’ agreed that ‘Immigration undermines British culture”.
Social background of ‘inners’, ‘outers’ and undecided voters. (Chatham House, 2015)
Therefore, this cultural negativity towards immigration manifests itself in many ways, one of which is opposition to the EU, through the conflation of (any) immigration with EU membership. One of the EU’s most sacred principles is freedom of movement, and the growing number of immigrants since the UK’s membership of the EU has only increased this Euroscepticism, which increased the likelihood of EU-UK referendum.
UKIP’s sudden rise
UKIP was
founded in 1991 and can be categorised as a single-issue party, with the sole
aim of bringing the UK out of the EU, via a referendum. Once Nigel Farage
became leader of UKIP in 2006, it grew in popularity, with gains in the 2013
local elections (22% of the vote), two Conservative Party defections to UKIP in
2013, and impressive results in both the 2014 European Parliament elections
(largest number of seats with 24) and the 2015 General Election (12.5% of the
popular vote). They were most certainly on the up.
Table to show distribution of seats in the European Parliament in 2014.
UKIP’s rise
led to Cameron’s electoral position becoming increasingly threatened: UKIP is a
right-wing party, whose voters were more likely to be white and older than that
of Labour’s electorate. Therefore, UKIP was able to split the Conservative vote
(Martill, 2018). In 2014, UKIP managed to gain over a
quarter of votes in European Parliament elections, outnumbering the
Conservatives. Understandably, this was a clear threat to the Conservative
Party at the time. Though support for UKIP was clearly influenced by other
factors, (i.e factors that pushed voters towards UKIP), UKIP managed to harness
Euroscepticism in the general public, and transform this into meaningful
political pressure on David Cameron to hold a referendum. The nature of UKIP’s
rise – sudden, large, and at a time when the Conservatives did not have a
majority (pre-2015 General Election), was a very important factor in leading to
the referendum. Arguably, UKIP’s pressure on Cameron led him to hold an
election, lest he lose public and potentially party support, and inevitably, a
general election. Therefore, due to the rise of UKIP, a party based on support
for a referendum on the EU, Cameron was incentivised to put a referendum
promise in his party’s manifesto in 2015 and hold one in 2016, in order to keep
his Conservative Government in office.
Cameron’s desire
for a quick fix
The Prime
Minister is by far the main source of authority over whether to hold a
referendum or not, so analysing Cameron is important in answering this essay’s
question. Cameron’s decision around party management was an impactful factor in
leading to the 2016 EU Referendum.
The promise
of a referendum can be seen as a ‘quick fix’ method of appeasement to the
Eurosceptic backbenchers. As is clear from the rise of the Conservative
Eurosceptic faction, heightened tensions were forming in the Conservative Party
from 2013 onwards, and this threatened the Party’s ability to govern. Hence,
Cameron felt compelled to manage his party over Europe, by delegating the
decision to the public. When the referendum was initially promised in June
2013, Cameron was concerned with stopping the backbenchers rebelling in the
coalition. He wanted to silence the Eurosceptic wing of the party that had
caused so much trouble for the party over the years; an ‘easy fix’ to a
longstanding problem (Martill, 2018). A comment that encapsulates this, is
from Donald Tusk (former President of the European Council), recounting his
meeting with Cameron after the referendum was announced in 2013:
“Why did you decide on this referendum, [Tusk recounts asking Cameron this] – it’s so dangerous, even stupid, you know, and he told me – and I was really amazed and even shocked – that the only reason was his own party… [He told me] he felt really safe, because he thought at the same time that there’s no risk of a referendum, because his coalition partner, the Liberals, would block this idea of a referendum” (BBC, 2019).
Clearly,
party management was very influential in Cameron’s decision-making. Therefore,
the decision desire to repair the divide in his party, was hugely impactful in
leading to the 2016 EU Referendum.
In
conclusion, the nature of our relationship with the EU, immigration sentiment, UKIP
and Cameron’s decision making were the most important factors in leading to the
EU Referendum. Especially impactful was UKIP’s ability to harness
Euroscepticism into political pressure. But arguably, the end of our EU
membership was spelt out from the beginning.
Works Cited
BBC, 2019. Inside Europe: Ten
Years of Turmoil. [Online]
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0c1rjj7
[Accessed 29 06 2021].
Bundesministeriums
des Innern, f. B. u. H. B., 2015. Freedom of movement. [Online]
Available at: https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/law-on-foreigners/freedom-of-movement/freedom-of-movement-node.html
[Accessed 29 06 2021].
Chatham
House, 2015. Britain, the European Union and the Referendum: What Drives
Euroscepticism?. [Online]
Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20151209EuroscepticismGoodwinMilazzo.pdf
[Accessed 9 20 2021].
Eurobarometer,
2015. National versus European identification, s.l.: s.n.
Holmes,
M., n.d. The Conservative Party and Europe. [Online]
Available at: https://www.brugesgroup.com/media-centre/papers/8-papers/807-the-conservative-party-and-europe
[Accessed 9 20 2021].
Martill,
B., 2018. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London:
UCL Press.
