The events that have unfolded in Afghanistan over the past month, the US UK withdrawal and subsequent Taliban takeover, have been on the lips of reporters and the public alike. Since Biden’s announcement, the crisis has only become more chaotic, with new developments and new angles being presented nearly every day. Only now has the situation seemed to cool down a little, though this is very much an outsider’s perspective. So, it might do to take a momentary step back, and discuss what has happened to Afghanistan in the round, and its implications.
The Bush administration declared the ‘War on Terror’ less than 24 hours after 9/11, an instantaneous reaction to one of the worst terrorist attacks in history, with 3,000 dead. By October 2001, US forces and her allies had begun military intervention in Afghanistan. Ever since then, the US has kept up a military presence in an attempt to stabilise the region and protect it from the Taliban. That is, until last month, when the Taliban took just 10 days to capture Kabul, following 20 years of military presence. Now that the new regime is up and running, there is a severe threat to women’s education, freedom of speech, freedom of information, and the harbouring of terrorists – direct contractions to US and Western ideals. So why on earth, with only a few thousand allied troops on the ground, did America choose to withdraw?
The argument goes that the USA pulled out of Afghanistan largely due to two factors. Firstly, the Afghanistan War has been America’s longest war, and has cost it 2 trillion dollars, burdening both current and future generations through tax and government debt. Around 2,000 US troops were killed, and 47,000 Afghan citizens lost their lives, while only the status quo maintained. Clearly, something was going wrong. Secondly, America is by and large apathetic to the Afghan war, partly due to the points above. Politically, the Afghan intervention was a Republican undertaking by Bush; there is little impetus for Biden to continue financing it. Biden claims the withdrawal is due to America taking a step back from foreign military intervention, and I do believe it does reflect that, but more significant was the apathy present in the US surrounding the topic.
This still doesn’t answer whether the US and UK should have left or not. I believe the jury is still out, so I won’t try and persuade you of either side dear reader, just simply present the other:
Tom Tugendhat, a Conservative MP who served in both the Iraq and Afghan War, spoke passionately about Afghanistan in parliament a few weeks ago. He makes this case far more eloquently than I can, (the parliamentary round of applause following his speech is testament to this), but I can paraphrase. There is a case to be had here regarding the ‘long game’ of American intervention. Although present for 20 years, for America to commit to its values, you could argue it must also be willing to commit to a very long-term presence in countries such as Afghanistan, as it did with South Korea. In addition, the US and UK helped 2.9 million girls into school by 2019 (from 0 in 2001) and reduce child mortality rates by 50% (BBC News + Associated Press). What’s more, we can’t forget the people that the Taliban will treat the worst – women (14.2 million of them in Afghanistan). It is inevitable that they will be treated with discrimination, likely having their education cut off and their rights stripped. That’s 14.2 million people the US’s withdrawal directly impacts.
What these events do show is a new form of American foreign policy, a move towards a more protectionist outlook. Though of course, America is still a key global player (Biden strengthening this), the withdrawal signals to the world how the US views its international role. Biden certainly desires to frame the argument this way, and he probably has reason to do so – American intervention is not viewed with the same positivity as it once was by its allies and its people.
The implications of this supposed change in heart vary. It may prevent needless intervention in countries that ultimately leaves them worse off, despite justifiable reasoning (some of the time). However, American ideals such as, freedom, democracy, an open market, are to be valued. With the world’s superpower now less willing to apply military force, we might see these principles fall to the wayside. Perhaps all it will take is a new global conflict/ terrorist attack to trigger the American interventionist gene – it’s hard to tell at the moment what is rhetoric, and what is a genuine change in practice. We can’t know yet, so watch this space.
One thing that crises have a habit of doing, whether from near or afar, is revealing cracks closer to home.
The Afghanistan withdrawal has brought to light the reality of Britain’s global position. Throughout this article, I have referred to the withdrawal as predominantly US led, despite the fact Britain and America (with the rest Nato) went into Afghanistan together, and left together. The fact is, once the US had decided to leave, it was impossible for the UK to remain on its own. Boris Johnson even tried to persuade Biden to extend the withdrawal deadline, yet with no avail. The strength of the special relationship has been questioned for a long time, and clearly the US is far more powerful than Britain, but this does show just how limited the UK is in terms of negotiating power with the US.
Last week, Unconquered Peaks published a cartoon depicting Dominic Raab (foreign secretary at the time) relaxing in his hotel room, with fire raging in the background, and his phone and TV chiming with Afghanistan news. Indeed, that seems to be not far from what really happened – Raab refused to take even one call to the Afghani president, let alone return to lead his department. His firing just this Tuesday in a cabinet reshuffle is testament to this. Not only have problems been revealed at the top, but also lower down. The Foreign Office has been accused of lacking in co-operation and communication, having just seven Pashto speakers (of varying ability), leading to confusion and poor execution. I would imagine Liz Truss, his replacement, will seek to ascertain exactly what went wrong, and how we can improve. One can only hope.
So, what should we do now? To engage or not engage, that is the question. Through engaging, we do run the risk of officiating the regime. However, we are better off getting involved sooner rather than later, in my opinion. A cautious approach may be best. It is undeniable that the Taliban does not deserve any help. Yet China and Russia will be the vying to help the new government before we do, in order to gain significant influence. Right now, while 90% of Afghanistan’s budget consists of foreign aid, we have a chance to engage when we will be most influential. Realistically, I think cautiously engaging will serve the West’s interest far more than doing nothing will.
The story of Afghanistan in the past 25 years is a sad one, critically for those living there. The chaotic withdrawal is done, and now begins a new chapter. A chapter in which The West and her allies must decide how best to deal with the Taliban and to learn from what went wrong. As Tugendhat compelling put it, “this doesn’t need to a defeat, but at the moment, it damn well feels like it.”
